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FROM ALTRUISTS TO OUTLAWS: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF TRAVELING
ISLAMIC VOLUNTEERS
Ramzi Kassem*
INTRODUCTION
The volunteerist dimension of Islamic philanthropy, although often
overshadowed of late by its financial counterpart as a focal point of interest,
was until recently an equally vibrant expression of transnational Muslim soli-
darity. The emblematic figures of the itinerant doctor, the aid worker, the
preacher and the fighter featured prominently in the actual mobilization and
associated narratives spurred by bloody conflicts in Muslim-majority lands
such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, and Afghanistan.' Along with the
scrutiny and policing of Islamic charities and financial networks amplified by
the so-called War on Terror came a heightened military and intelligence fo-
cus on traveling Muslims who volunteered in various capacities in distant
and troubled regions. "Out of place" Muslims came to be regarded and
treated as combatants by various governments. 2 The aforementioned em-
blematic figures were conflated into one-that of the fighter-and were
criminalized. This Article will begin to explore how that particular process
of conflation, exclusion and criminalization occurred.
A host of fascinating questions arise in this connection which fall
outside the intended scope of the inquiry at hand. One important question
* Assistant Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. My grati-
tude to Ash I. Bli and the student organizers of the thought-provoking UCLA conference on
the criminalization of philanthropy, and to Khaled Abou El Fadl and Susan Slyomovics for
their guidance and hospitality. I also owe thanks to Darryl Li for his thoughtful comments and
to Michael Figura, whose research and writing assistance greatly advanced this Article's pro-
gress. Finally, I would be remiss not to mention the constant support of my family and
friends.
I See JONATHAN BENTHALL & JiEROME BELLION-JOURDAN, THE CHARITABLE CRESCENT:
PouTics OF AID IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 69 (2003).
2 See Darryl Li, A Universal Enemy?: "Foreign Fighters" and Legal Regimes of Exclusion
and Exemption Under the "Global War on Terror" 41 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 355, 374
(2010).
85
10 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 85 (2011)
pertains to how longstanding and established a tradition Islamic volunteerism
represents. Some commentators have concluded that current or contempo-
rary commitments to humanitarian intervention are beyond the level Islamic
tradition would legitimate. 3 Another question relates to the extent to which
the aforementioned emblematic roles are distinct and whether they have been
seen over time as fungible, complementary or situated on a single unified
continuum of engagement.4 These questions, though important, are beyond
the reach of this paper. They lie in a distinct realm, more at the intersection
of cultural anthropology, history, theology and Islamic law. While there is
some debate about how far back in Islamic tradition these volunteerist activi-
ties reach, it is clear that in recent times they have been seen as an important
and intrinsic part of Islamic charitable conduct.5 It also bears noting that
these activities can be more redistributive in spirit than charitable in the con-
ventional Judeo-Christian philanthropic understanding. 6 The emphasis is
often on social justice rather than charity per se.
TYPOLOGIES AND DISTINCTIONS
There are multiple forms of traveling Islamic volunteerist commitment,
undertaken broadly in the name of Islamic solidarity. They could be reduced
to three main expressions.7 The first is da'wa, which is the act of calling
others to the faith or to a better practice of the faith, best illustrated by the
figure of the preacher.8 The second is ighatha, which can be translated as
relief and is exemplified by the figures of the aid worker and the doctor. The
final one is qital, which is military action, represented by the fighter. The
3 See Sohail H. Hashmi, Is There an Islamic Ethic of Humanitarian Intervention?, in JUST
INTERVENTION 62, 62 (Anthony F. Lang, Jr. ed., 2003) (noting that the traditional conception
of the umma conflicts with notions of state sovereignty); but see Engseng Ho, Empire
Through Diasporic Eyes: A View from the Other Boat, 46 Comie. STUD. Soc'y & HisT. 210
(2004) (examining the transnational religious and spiritual influence of the Hadrami Arab
diaspora).
4 See BENTHALL & BELLION-JORDAN, supra note 1, at 70.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Da'wa encompasses religious outreach for both conversion and the rededication of lapsed
Muslims. JUAN E. CAM[o, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 178 (2009). Da'wa activities undertaken
by Islamic organizations often include the promulgation of social welfare programs. RON
G1AVES, ASPECTS OF ISLAM 176, 180 (2005); see also Mona Ali Atia, Building a House in
Heaven: Islamic Charity in Neoliberal Egypt 31 (June 10, 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Washington) (on file with ProQuest).
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term jihad is often reductively misapplied to this category. 9 Over time, these
roles have become distinct enough to sustain separate discussion, regardless
of how fungible they may have been in past perception or practice.
This Article will deliberately ignore the fraught figure of the fighter in
order to sidestep politically and positionally contingent viewpoints and con-
troversies about both the legitimacy and legality of that particular variant of
Islamic volunteerism. Engrossing as they would be, those discussions would
distract from the Article's purpose. Instead the question explored here is how
even those forms of Islamic volunteerism that most closely align with main-
stream, non-Muslim or, more specifically, European and North American
conceptions of conventional philanthropic volunteerism have fared in what
has been referred to as the global War on Terror.
CRIMINALIZATION OF VOLUNTEERIsM BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11
This inquiry is rooted in the post-9/1 I world and some of the illustrative
examples detailed and examined herein are drawn from cases handled by the
author and his students on behalf of individuals who were imprisoned for
years in places like Guantdinamo Bay, Cuba, Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan,
and other U.S. and associated sites worldwide. However, it would be error to
conclude that targeting and criminalization only began post 9/11. Though
these approaches were scaled up dramatically at that historical juncture, they
were not unprecedented. Another major escalation dates back to the end of
the Cold War, when the United States no longer benefited from the services
of some segments of the Islamic networks that existed in Afghanistan and
other like places. The United States began pressuring certain allies and per-
mitting other allies to dismantle the very networks it had sustained finan-
cially, militarily, and otherwise up to that time. These transnational
solidarity networks were from their inception regarded as potential threats by
many regimes in the Muslim world, including U.S. allies like Egypt and
Pakistan.
With the Soviet Union's decline, these networks lost their redeeming
qualities and became, to American eyes, solely a menace to the U.S. interest
in the stability of its regional allies, an interest that existed irrespective of
9 Jihad is generally interpreted by Muslim scholars to include a concept of jihad akbar, or
greater struggle, which refers to the "inner struggle . . . for righteousness," and jihad asghar,
or lesser struggle, which encompasses armed struggle against those who threaten the Muslim
community. RON GEAVES, supra note 8. While acknowledging that jihad may have had a
differing historical meaning, polemicists such as Daniel Pipes have sought to define and asso-
ciate the term primarily with a violent struggle for Muslim world domination. See, e.g.,
Daniel Pipes, What is Jihad?, N.Y. POST, Dec. 31, 2002.
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those allies' domestic practices and abuses. It is at that point that the balance
of interests shifted and U.S. policy was realigned to encourage and promote
the dismantling of those networks. In 1992, the Pakistani government under
then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif began cracking down on many of the net-
works and organizations that were implanted along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border.10 These efforts were undertaken in the name of anti-terrorist policy,
with the encouragement and support of the United States and various Arab
regimes.1 I
PRESENCE AND ASSOCIATION As TRANSGRESSION
After 9/11, the exclusion and criminalization of transnational Muslim
volunteers by the United States and its allies happened in two main stages.
The first level of exclusion and criminalization-imprisonment-is worth
examining in some detail, focusing initially on the mechanisms that trigger it.
Imprisonment is important because it is the first recognizable marker of
criminalization and exclusion. The United States utilized two strikingly
loose and arbitrary selection mechanisms that led to the incarceration of
Muslim volunteers. First, it relied on actors in Pakistan and Afghanistan who
were often driven by the prospect of financial gain or personal advance-
ment. 12 It also extended the net of suspicion to individuals and groups that
were at most tenuously and indirectly connected to persons or organizations
of actual interest.13
1o See BENTHALL & BELLION-JORDAN, supra note 1, at 77; cf Kathy Gannon, Pakistan to
Deport at Least 98 Arabs, ASSOCIATED PREss, Apr. 10, 1993 ("Islamabad is afraid their pres-
ence will lead Washington to declare it a terrorist state and deprive it of economic
privileges.").
I In January 1993, Pakistan was in fact placed on the U.S. list of potential terrorist states. It
was removed 6 months later. IAN TALBOT, PAKISTAN: A MODERN HISTORY 317 (2005); see
also BENTHALL & BELLION-JORDAN supra note 1, at 77.
12 See e.g., Michelle Faul, Gitmo Detainees Say Muslims Were Sold, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 31, 2005 (recounting that detainees captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan were sold to
American, Afghani and Pakistani authorities for bounties); Jan McGirk, Pakistani Writes of
His U.S. Ordeal, BOSTON GiLOBE, Nov. 17, 2002, at A30 (citing intelligence sources that
Northern Alliance commanders forced confessions of men near battlefields in order to sell
them for a reward).
13 See Mark Denbeaux & Joshua Denbeaux, Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of
517 Detainees Through Department of Defense Data Feb. 8, 2006, at 18, available at http://
law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/guantanamo-report-final_2_08_06.pdf (noting
that "only 11% of all organizations listed by the Combatant Status Review Board as proof of
links to al Qaeda or the Taliban are identified as having any links to Qaeda or the Taliban in
the Terrorist Organization Reference Guide" (emphasis in original)).
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Bounty leaflets were designed by various U.S. national security agen-
cies and intelligence services and disseminated in Afghanistan after the inva-
sion that followed the 9/11 attacks. One such leaflet, for example, offered a
reward of five thousand U.S. dollars in exchange for any presumed Taliban
or al-Qa'ida fighter.14 Some offered far larger-and far less realistic-sums
of money in exchange for captives.15 Many of the men who, like my clients,
ended up in the U.S. military prisons at Bagram, Kandahar and Guantinamo
were turned over for bounties similar to the ones offered in these leaflets,
ranging from five to sometimes twenty thousand dollars, large amounts of
money anywhere in the world but especially in countries with less affluent
populations such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.16
The leaflets reflect a broad and undiscerning framing. They speak of
terrorists, of Taliban or al-Qa'ida fighters, quite broadly. Many individuals
were seen, and more importantly sold, as fighters, whether or not they ever
were. Loose selection mechanisms made it easy to cast a blanket of
criminalization onto large groups in these regions. As a result, Arabs "out of
place" in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions were frequently abducted
and sold into U.S. custody for bounty by local authorities and residents who
were often exclusively motivated by personal gain. The vetting mechanisms
put in place by U.S. authorities to verify the identity and activities of hos-
tages turned over to U.S. custody were all too often weak or non-existent.
Over-reliance on allies and actors of questionable motivation without a
meaningful independent verification process was a primary mechanism
yielding the outcome of imprisonment, which constitutes the first level of
criminalization of traveling Islamic volunteers in the post-9/1 I world. But it
was not the only mechanism. It was paired with a blanket perception and
characterization on the U.S. government's part of Islamic NGOs as fronts for
terror organizations and of traveling Islamic volunteers in particular as fight-
ers in disguise.' 7
14 App. A.
15 App. B.
16 See Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 13, at 15; see also JOSEPH MARGULIll.s, GUANTA-
NAMO AND THE AnusE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 69 (2006).
1 Illustrative of the view was President George W. Bush's statement in his September 24,
2001 press conference: "Just to show you how insidious these terrorists are, they oftentimes
use nice-sounding, non-governmental organizations as fronts for their activities. We have
targeted three such NGOs. We intend to deal with them, just like we intend to deal with others
who aid and abet terrorist organizations." White House Office of the Press Secretary, Presi-
dent Freezes Terrorists' Assets, Remarks by the President (Sept. 24, 2001), http://georgew
bush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html.
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That categorical perception features quite prominently in the declassi-
fied records of tribunals at Guantinamo. References to "charity" appear in
the tribunal records of eighty-four Guantinamo prisoners.' 8 One example
arose in the case of a client, Mammar Ameur, an Algerian national unlaw-
fully imprisoned for six years and three months at various U.S. sites includ-
ing Guantinamo. The unclassified summary of the accusations directed
against him before an Administrative Review Board ("ARB") focused on his
affiliation with various humanitarian organizations.' 9 The factors favoring
continued imprisonment enumerated by the military ARB read as might a
seasoned humanitarian aid worker's curriculum vitae. The list displays five
NGOs that employed Ameur in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region
reaching back to the early nineties. Ameur's task was to assist hospitals and
various other aid-oriented institutions to achieve their purpose. His activities
and affiliations were portrayed by the U.S. military as indicia of culpability
and were cited to justify the prolongation of Ameur's unlawful imprisonment
at Guantinamo. The blanket perception and characterization by the U.S.
government of charitable work as cover for dangerous activity is evident in
the cases of many other prisoners as well.
Another client, Ahmed Zuhair, was in the custody of the United States
and associated governments at various sites including Guantinamo from De-
cember 2001 until June 2009, when he was finally repatriated to Saudi Ara-
bia. An examination of the summary of accusations against Zuhair before a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") at Guantinamo is equally in-
structive when attempting to grasp the U.S. government's view of Islamic
charity and volunteerism. 20 The summary was the only reflection of the evi-
dence that a Guantinamo prisoner would be permitted to review before the
CSRT convened to decide the prisoner's immediate fate. Prisoners were de-
nied the assistance of an attorney2' and they did not have access to the secret
18 The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (search
the Guantinamo docket for: "charity") (last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
19 Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the Case of Mam-
mar Ameur, N.Y. TIMEs, July 25, 2005, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/
939-mammar-ameur#21.
20 Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the Case of
Zohair, Ahmed Zeid Salem, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 2006, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantana
mo/detainees/669-ahmed-zaid-salim-zuhair/documents/5/pages/540#5.
21 Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military
Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Enclosure 1: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Process (July 14, 2006) at 2 § C(3)
and 4 § F(5), available at http://www.defenselink.millnews/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProce
dures.pdf [hereinafter CSRT Process]; see also Brian J. Foley, Guantanamo and Beyond:
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evidence. 22 They were offered an opportunity to respond to the summary,
without more.2 3 Some prisoners chose to avail themselves of that opportu-
nity, others did not. Ameur debunked what little evidence he was permitted
to see when he came before the military review panel. 24 Zuhair, on the other
hand, like many Guantdinamo prisoners, opted to boycott what he viewed as
sham proceedings.
The evidence cited against Zuhair paints a typical picture of guilt by
loose association. Patently at work in the portrayal is the notion that a single
bad apple, or one bad link in the chain, suffices to cast a broad net of suspi-
cion on entire organizations or even networks of organizations. Zuhair's
work in Bosnia for the Charitable Community for Orphans was viewed as a
factor favoring continued detention because an unnamed individual involved
with the organization was characterized as an international terrorist. The
summary of accusations also states that the relief agency Croatian Assistance
is funded in part by the Saudi Al-Haramain foundation, then alleges the foun-
Dangers of Rigging the Rules 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1009, 1022-1035 (discussing
the unreliability of the CSRTs).
22 CSRT Process, supra note 21, at 4 § F(8); see also id. at 8 § H(8).
23 Id. at 6 §§ G(9), G(10).
24 For example:
3.1 The Detainee was captured in a suspected al Qaida safehouse.
Detainee: . . .1 am disappointed that the Americans don't have a higher standard.
The evidence is all fabricated. Of course, without a lawyer or attorney here, I will
try by myself to defend myself. Whoever fabricated these accusations didn't know
how. How could he not be lying in the classified information I don't know of.
Whoever knows about what is happening in Islam would not fabricate something
like this. . .. In regards to accusation number one, that the house you say belongs to
al Qaida is located behind the military and civilian airport in Peshawar, Pakistan.
This house I was living in with my wife and four kids, has two rooms, one bath-
room and one small kitchen. . .. One of your intelligence members . . . entered
the house, took pictures, and may have taken things. . .. Do you think the house
would be for al Qaida people, to come and stay or live, in the bedroom of my kids
or me and my wife?
Tribunal President: We just need you to answer the question; were you captured in
an al Qaida safe house?
Detainee: No, of course not. I'm just trying to prove it was not possible, because
whoever fabricated this didn't know how big the house was. Do you think al Qaida
does not have money to rent a bigger house with more rooms?
Personal Representative: You also mentioned it was near a police station?
Detainee: Yes. Because the house was located behind the military and civilian
airport. . .. Pakistani intelligence is everywhere. Do you think al Qaida only has
this dangerous place?. .Only if they're stupid. I don't think they are stupid.
Summarized Sworn Detainee Statement (Mammar Ameur, CSRT Round 1), N.Y. TIMES, http:/
projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/939-mammar-ameur/documents/4/pages/447.
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dation "maintains connections" with al-Qa'ida. Links of this nature were fre-
quently offered to tie humanitarian relief work to terrorism and justify
indefinite imprisonment at Guantinamo. 25
LEGITIMIZING CRIMINALIZATION
The second level of exclusion is marked by an effort to legitimize the
criminalization of Islamic volunteerism. The U.S. government erected a
range of quasi-legal systems in an attempt to justify its sweeping dragnet.
The military Administrative Review Boards ("ARB") were established to re-
view the findings of Combatant Status Review Tribunal ("CSRT") at GuantA-
namo.26 By the end of the Bush administration, the ARBs had conducted
three rounds of reviews. At the U.S. military prison at Bagram Airbase, Af-
ghanistan, the Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Boards ("UECRB") were
replaced by the Detainee Review Boards ("DRB"), which are still operating
today.27 A veritable alphabet soup of processes and procedures was
deployed at Guantdinamo and Bagram to project the appearance of process
and fairness while in fact conferring very little of either.
The CSRT, according to the U.S. government, was designed to deter-
mine whether an individual was properly designated and imprisoned as an
enemy combatant. 28 The tribunal's purpose was to assess if an individual
was a member of or supported the Taliban or al-Qa'ida forces or associated
forces. The broad language defining an enemy combatant encompassed "an
25 Of course, the CSRT accusation sheet also reflects that the U.S. government leveled even
more inflammatory accusations against Zuhair. Those accusations were demonstrably un-
founded. See Traverse at 42-56, Zuhair v. Bush, 08-CV-864 (D.D.C. Dec. 31, 2008), ECF No.
116 (demonstrating baseless nature of U.S. government's public allegations regarding Zuhair).
26 See CSRT Process, supra note 21; see also Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum
for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Revised Implementation of Administrative Review Proce-
dures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, "Combat-
ant Status Review Tribunal Process" (July 14, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Aug2006/d2006O8O9ARBProceduresMemo.pdf [hereinafter ARB Memo].
27 DEP'T OF DEFENSr, Detainee Review Procedures at Bagram Theater Internment Facility
(BTIF), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/nimj/documents/addendum.pdf. These new
review procedures have been criticized by human rights groups as inadequate. See HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, Fixing Bagram: Strengthening Detention Reforms to Align with U.S. Strategic
Priorities, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/Fixing-Bagram- 1 10409.pdf; see
also Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that detention review
procedures at Bagram were inadequate under Boumediene), rev'd on other grounds by Al
Maqaleh v. Gates 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming that review process at Bagram is
inadequate, but holding that weight of remaining jurisdictional factors requires dismissal of
habeas corpus petitions brought by Bagram prisoners).
28 CSRT Process, supra note 21, at 1 § B.
92 10 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 85 (2011)
From Altruists to Outlaws
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or asso-
ciated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners. This include[d] any person who has committed belligerent
act[s] or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy combat forces."29
The definition was not restricted to activities of a military nature. It was
calibrated to capture individuals like Ameur, Zuhair and other Islamic volun-
teers in conflict zones, even if they never had any involvement in military
activity of any sort.
That expansive definition inspired the detention authority standard pro-
posed by the U.S. government to federal courts devising procedures and
norms for the adjudication of Guantdinamo habeas corpus petitions in the
wake of Boumediene v. Bush.3 0 The Bush administration asked courts to
approve the indefinite imprisonment of any "individual who was part of or
supporting Taliban or [al-Qa'idal forces or associated forces that are engaged
in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners."31 The
Obama administration did not narrow the proposed definition much, asking
courts to uphold the imprisonment of "persons who were part of, or substan-
tially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are en-
gaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners." 32
Federal district and appellate courts adopted and applied this permissive de-
tention authority standard as they adjudicated the Guantinamo habeas cases
on their merits. 3 3 The federal courts also held that the U.S. government only
needed to meet that detention authority standard by a mere preponderance of
the evidence-instead of by clear and convincing evidence or beyond a rea-
sonable doubt-in order to warrant potentially lifelong imprisonment. 34
29 Id.
30 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that the jurisdiction-stripping provi-
sion of the Military Commissions Act violated the Suspension Clause, improperly denying
Guantlnamo prisoners their constitutional entitlement to challenge their detention through
habeas corpus petitions before federal courts).
3' See, e.g., Resp'ts' Mem. Addressing the Definition of Enemy Combatant, Boumediene v.
Bush, 04-CV-1 166, at 5 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2008), ECF No. 228.
32 See, e.g., Resp'ts' Mem. Regarding the Gov't's Detention Authority Relative to Detainees
Held at Guantanamo, Zuhair v. Bush et. al, No. 08-0864 at 2 (Mar. 13, 2009), ECF No. 160; In
re Petitioners Seeking Habeas Corpus Relief in Rel. to Prior Detentions at Guantanamo Bay,
700 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2010).
33 See, e.g., In re Petitioners, supra note 32, at 150; Sulayman v. Obama, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82586 (D.D.C. July 20, 2010).
34 See Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir
2010); Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2009); Bihani v. Obama, 594 F.
Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2009); Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49 (D.D.C. 2008); El
Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 146 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d
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It is within the second level of exclusion and criminalization that we
witness the migration into established judicial systems and processes of the
original impulse to legitimize the capture of broad swathes of Muslim volun-
teers that found its first expression in ad hoc, exceptional military mecha-
nisms and entities such as the ARBs. In a very real sense, by adhering in
their adjudication of Guantdinamo habeas cases to an almost identical defini-
tion of who is detainable, the hallowed federal courts inherit a share of the
imperfections of the infamous CSRTs in this domain. In so doing, the civil-
ian courts also perpetuate-albeit in far more limited fashion-the impro-
vised military tribunals' core mission of legitimizing the sweeping
criminalization of Islamic volunteerism.3 5
CLAIMING UNIVERSALITY
The mechanisms operating at both aforementioned levels of the
criminalization process are constructed in a way that leaves ample berth for
arbitrariness in the use of force-including deprivation of liberty-against
particular categories of individuals, while again seeking to project the ap-
pearance of process and fairness. That authorities would choose to direct the
arbitrary power they wield at Muslim volunteers broadly should constitute no
surprise because these transnational solidarity networks came to be viewed as
a threat to local and U.S. interests in the Muslim world, but also because,
post 9/11, the U.S. security apparatus resolved to err on the side of over-
inclusivity in its targeting choices. That resolve, interestingly, was com-
pounded and reinforced by a deeply problematic theme, which is where this
inquiry concludes.
24, 27 (D.D.C. 2008); Hammamy v. Obama, 604 F. Supp. 2d 240, 242 (D.D.C. 2009);
Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d. 30, 35 n.12 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Ginco v. Obama, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53932, at *6-7 (D.D.C. June 22, 2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp.
2d 191, 195-96 (D.D.C. 2008); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Al
Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78, 81 (D.D.C. July 29, 2009).
35 Only 38 of the 538 detainees who were subject to the CSRT process were released as a
result. Mark Denbeaux & Joshua Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings CSRT: The Modern
Habeas Corpus?, at 39, available at http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/
final no hearing-hearings-report.pdf (last visited October 18, 2010). Of the 57 Guantinamo
habeas cases decided by the federal courts, the writ has been granted in 37. However, of the
37, roughly a third remain in U.S. custody. The current Guantinamo population is at 172
prisoners. See CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS, Guantanamo Bay Habeas Decision Scorecard, http://
ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/guantanamo-bay-habeas-decision-scorecard (last visited Apr.
17, 2011). The outcome disparity as between the CSRTs and federal courts, despite both
systems' application of broad and virtually indistinguishable detention authority standards,
highlights the significance of representation, access to evidence, an impartial arbiter, and other
core procedural and substantive safeguards.
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The theme is that support for terror is the only possible reason for a
foreign Muslim to be present in a conflict zone. It matters little, in this par-
ticular viewpoint, that non-Muslim NGOs and non-Muslim fighters, such as
U.S. forces, are no less foreign and out of place in countries like Afghanistan.
Given the power dynamic, the United States has arrogated to itself a position
of universality and universal legitimacy. From that position the United
States can justify one party's actions while, on the other hand, delegitimizing
and criminalizing another party's actions. 36 Thus, Afghans, for instance, are
permitted to exist and operate within parameters that are set by the universal
American overlord, but they are not to overstep their ghetto of geographical
and cultural specificity in any way. Only the United States can do that.
36 See Li, supra note 2, at 376-78 (referring to a "braided logic of exemption and exclusion"
which removes legal protection for foreign Muslims while protecting Westerners from local
liability).
95
10 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 85 (2011)
APPENDIX A
AFGHANISTAN BOUNTY LEAFLET
TRANSLATION:
FRONT: The reward, about $4,285, would be paid to any citizen who aided in
the capture of Taliban or al-Qaida fighters."
BACK: Dear Countrymen: The ai Qaeda terrorists are our enemy. They are
the enemy of your independence and freedom. Come on. Let us find their
most secret hiding places. Search them out and inform the intelligence
service of the province and get the big prize."
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APPENDIx B
Afghanistan Leaflets
TF11-RP09-1
FRONT
"Get wealth and power beyond your dreams. Help the Anti-Taliban Forces rid
Afghanistan of murderers and terrorists."
BACK
TEXT ONLY
"You can receive millions of dollars for helping the Anti-Taliban Forces catch al-Qaeda
and Taliban muderers. This is enough money to take care of your family, your village.
Your tribe for the rest of vour life. Pay for livestock and doctors and school books and
housing for all your people."
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